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I. INTRODUCTION 
The oft-cited decision Heck v. Humphrey
1
 has led to years of mis-
interpretation and confusion regarding the time of accrual of certain 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
2
  The Court decreed, in pertinent part, that 
“in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional convic-
tion or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose un-
lawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been re-
versed on direct appeal,” or that it would otherwise be invalidated.
3
  
The Court further stated that such a claim would not otherwise be 
cognizable under the statute, and that if the district court were to de-
termine that “a judgment [on the § 1983 claim] in favor of the plain-
tiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sen-
tence,” it must dismiss the case until the litigant can prove that the 
conviction has been so invalidated.
4
  Although it was clear that the 
Heck bar would apply to a § 1983 claim where a valid conviction was 
 
 * J.D., 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Haverford College.  
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 1 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
 2 Section 1983 states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress  
. . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  Section 1983 claims vindicate constitutional rights; for ex-
ample, individuals can bring § 1983 actions for false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
and selective enforcement. 
 3 Id. at 486–87. 
 4 Id. at 487. 
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already in existence at the time of filing, the prevailing view among 
the circuit courts was that the Heck bar would also apply to a § 1983 
claim by a plaintiff whose criminal charges were still pending if suc-
cess on the § 1983 claim would threaten the validity of a potential fu-
ture conviction in the underlying criminal action.
5
 
From this conclusion, it became a common perception among 
the circuit courts that a § 1983 claim did not accrue until the § 1983 
litigant received a favorable outcome in his underlying criminal trial 
or in subsequent post-conviction proceedings.
6
  In Wallace v. Kato, the 
Supreme Court intervened and clarified the meaning of Heck.
7
  Ap-
plying the traditional rule that a claim accrues when the litigant has a 
“complete and present cause of action,”
8
 the Court stated that the 
plaintiff, Andre Wallace, could have filed his § 1983 claim for false ar-
rest and false imprisonment against his arresting officer as soon as 
the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, thereby indicating that such a 
claim accrues at that time.
9
  After clarifying the issue of claim accrual, 
the Court explained that the statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim 
for false imprisonment begins to run when the arrestee is bound over 
by a magistrate and held pursuant to legal process.
10
 
 
 5 See Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (“[M]ost 
if not all circuits concluded that Heck [also] barred a section 1983 claim by a plaintiff 
with criminal charges pending against him if success in the 1983 suit would be incon-
sistent with a future conviction.” (emphasis added)); see also Harvey v. Waldron, 210 
F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396, 398 
(6th Cir. 1999); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999); Uboh v. 
Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1006–07 (11th Cir. 1998); Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 
552, 556 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996); Schilling v. 
White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 6 See, e.g., Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety-Div. of 
State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 447 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Under Heck, § 1983 claims for dam-
ages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence do not accrue until 
the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”). 
 7 549 U.S. 384 (2007). 
 8 Id. at 388 (citing Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. 
Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)). 
 9 The Court explained that “[e]very confinement of the person is an imprison-
ment.”  Id. at 388 (quoting MARTIN L. NEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MALICIOUS 
PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS § 2, at 57 (Chicago, Cal-
laghan and Company 1892) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  “False arrest and 
false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter.”  Id.  Therefore, the 
Court refers to the two torts together as “false imprisonment.”  Id. at 389. 
 10 Id.  The Court explained that “the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
alleged false imprisonment ends.”  Id. at 389.  “[T]hat is, the date petitioner became 
held pursuant to legal process,” id. at 393, as “the sort of unlawful detention remedia-
ble by the tort of false imprisonment is detention without legal process,”  id. 389. 
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 Overruling a decade’s worth of misinterpretations of Heck, the 
Wallace Court characterized the notion that Heck could bar “an action 
which would impugn an anticipated future conviction” as a “bizarre ex-
tension of Heck” and declared that courts should no longer embrace 
such an interpretation.
11
  Although the Supreme Court did provide 
some clarity through the Wallace decision, the lower courts continue 
to grapple with its application.
12
  In effect, Wallace requires the imme-
diate filing of § 1983 actions, exposing litigants to the possibility of 
having to litigate their criminal and civil trials simultaneously.  Alt-
hough the employment of a federal rule of equitable tolling in such 
circumstances would mitigate the harsh effects of the Wallace deci-
sion, the majority rejected the adoption of such a rule in this con-
text.
13
  Justice Breyer advocated in his dissenting opinion for equita-
ble tolling of the statute of limitations on the § 1983 claim for the 
duration of the state criminal proceedings, including the criminal 
trial and the time during which the criminal defendant seeks an ap-
peal from a conviction or other post-conviction relief.
14
  The majority, 
however, refused to recognize a federal rule of equitable tolling, not-
ing that the Court typically relies on state law when determining 
whether to toll a claim on a case-by-case basis.
15
 
Part II of this comment will briefly explain the interplay between 
federal and state law with regard to § 1983 claims.  Part III will ex-
plore the Heck decision and the lower courts’ interpretation of the 
decision before the intervening Wallace decision.  Part IV will provide 
an in-depth explanation of the Wallace case.  This section will discuss 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Wallace, as well as the majority’s 
rejection of it.  Further, Part IV will argue that the Court should have 
adopted a federal rule of equitable tolling—as advocated for by Jus-
tice Breyer—so that the statute of limitations on § 1983 claims would 
be tolled for the duration of the litigant’s underlying criminal trial, as 
well as for the time during which post-conviction relief is sought.  
This would prevent those with potentially meritorious § 1983 claims, 
who have either received favorable outcomes in their criminal trials 
or on appeal from their convictions, from being barred by the statute 
 
 11 Id. at 393. 
 12 See, e.g., Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2010); Cress v. City of 
Ventnor, No. 08-1873, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22172 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009); Telfair v. 
Tandy, No. 08-731, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83462 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2008); Kucharski v. 
Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 13 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394. 
 14 Id. at 404 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 15 Id. at 394 (majority opinion). 
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of limitations.  Part V will explore the effects of the Wallace Court’s 
requirement that a § 1983 litigant file the civil claim within such a 
short period of time, including how the filing of the claim before in-
stitution of the criminal prosecution may effectively bind prosecutors’ 
hands to proceed with the criminal charge in an effort to protect the 
police officers who have potentially violated the litigant’s constitu-
tional rights.  This section will also discuss the implications of forcing 
the litigant to handle both causes of action—the underlying criminal 
trial and the § 1983 civil claim—simultaneously.  Finally, this section 
will discuss Wallace’s “footnote four,” in which the Court identified, 
but declined to provide a remedy for, a possible injustice that could 
occur under the majority’s holding and thus produce a “result surely 
not intended” by Heck.16 
Finally, Part VI will present a separate argument exploring the 
inequities caused by this new interpretation of Heck against those 
criminal defendants who have relied on prior interpretations of the 
decision.  This section will argue that, notwithstanding the earlier-
presented argument that equitable tolling should be offered to a § 
1983 litigant for the duration of his or her underlying criminal trial 
and any appeal therefrom, courts should offer equitable tolling on 
independent grounds due to reliance on pre-existing precedent and 
the confusion caused by a new interpretation of the governing law. 
II. SECTION 1983 AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
To state a cause of action under § 1983, the claimant must allege 
(1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States and (2) that the alleged deprivation was caused by a 
person acting under the color of state law.
17
  “Section 1983 does not 
create substantive rights.  It, instead, provides a federal cause of ac-
tion for the violation of a federal right.”
18
  State law determines when 
a § 1983 claim accrues, provides the statute of limitations applicable 
to the § 1983 claim, and also determines whether the limitations pe-
riod should be tolled, unless tolling is inconsistent with federal law.
19
 
In the context of § 1983 claims—and specifically those for false 
imprisonment—the Wallace Court identified the most pertinent stat-
 
 16 Id. at 395 n.4. 
 17 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 
F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 18 Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Okla. City v. 
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)). 
 19 Wilson v. Garcia, 417 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (citing Wal-
lace, 549 U.S. at 387). 
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ute of limitations to be that for personal-injury torts, the length of 
which is typically two to three years, depending on the state.
20
  Federal 
law governs the issue of what constitutes accrual.
21
  “Accrual is the oc-
currence of damages caused by a wrongful act—when a plaintiff has a 
complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can 
file suit and obtain relief.”
22
  The Wallace Court, noting that claim ac-
crual does not depend on whether the extent of injury is fully 
known,
23
 found resolution of the underlying criminal trial to be un-
necessary in determining the validity of the § 1983 claim of false im-
prisonment.
24
  Although Wallace’s claim of false imprisonment ac-
crued immediately upon his arrest, the Court noted that the statute 
of limitations for false imprisonment claims is delayed and does not 
yet begin to run until the individual becomes held pursuant to legal 
process.25 
III. PRE-WALLACE INTERPRETATIONS OF HECK V. HUMPHREY AND § 1983 
CLAIM ACCRUAL 
In Heck, the Court triggered years of confusion with one state-
ment: “[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 
conviction or imprisonment, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 
conviction” has been invalidated.
26
  In Heck, the Court was faced with 
a litigant who had already been convicted of voluntary manslaughter 
in state court, and whose appeal of that conviction was still pending.
27
  
In his § 1983 complaint, Heck alleged, among other things, that the 
investigation that led to his arrest was unlawful and that the police 
had knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence.
28
  Finding that Heck’s 
§ 1983 claim raised issues that disputed the legality of his conviction 
and confinement, the district court dismissed the action.
29
  On ap-
 
 20 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389; see also Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (“A section 1983 claim is 
characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s 
statute of limitations for person-injury claims.”). 
 21 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. 
 22 Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 23 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391. 
 24 Id. at 397.  The Court noted that only the tort of malicious prosecution, the 
focus of the Heck decision, actually requires as an element of the offense the favora-
ble termination of criminal proceedings.  Id. at 392. 
 25 Id. at 389.  
 26 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 
 27 Id. at 478–89. 
 28 Id. at 479. 
 29 Id. 
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peal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, as did the Supreme 
Court.
30
  Heck stands for the principle that if a “judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his [existing] 
conviction or sentence[,] . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless 
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has al-
ready been invalidated.”
31
  At the heart of Heck was the fear that a 
convicted criminal defendant would use the § 1983 civil action to at-
tack his existing conviction rather than exhaust his state remedies.
32
 
Although the Court intended that Heck would apply only to situ-
ations in which the § 1983 litigant had a valid criminal judgment in 
existence at the time of filing, most circuit courts concluded that Heck 
would also bar a § 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff with pending 
criminal charges if a victory in the § 1983 suit would be inconsistent 
with a potential conviction not yet rendered.
33
  The circuit courts col-
lectively reached this conclusion even though the plaintiff in Heck 
had already been convicted, and the Court did not contemplate or 
address whether the possibility of a future conviction could also bar 
such a claim.
34
  Thus began more than a decade’s worth of decisions 
grounded in the belief that Heck “concluded that proof of the illegali-
ty of a conviction is a necessary element of the § 1983 cause of action” 
and that “[u]nless that conviction has been reversed, there has been 
no injury of constitutional proportions, and thus no § 1983 suit may 
exist.”
35
  This notion persisted until the Supreme Court intervened to 
clarify its holding in Heck with its decision in Wallace. 
 
 30 Id. at 479, 486. 
 31 Id. at 487. 
 32 See Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, No. 07-122-DLB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17301, 
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 6, 2008). 
 33 Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2007).  “Many civil 
right attorneys had [also] traditionally assumed that a civil rights claim for false ar-
rest could not proceed unless the underlying criminal charges had been fully re-
solved in the claimant’s favor.”  James B. Chanin, James B. Chanin on Wallace v. Kato, 
Dec. 14, 2007, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, at 1–2, available at LEXIS, 2008 
Emerging Issues 1501. 
 34 Heck, 512 U.S. at 478. 
 35 Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995); see also e.g., Harvey v. 
Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Heck applies to pending criminal 
charges, and that a claim, that if successful would necessarily imply the invalidity of a 
conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, does not accrue so long as the poten-
tial for a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.”); 
Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he concerns 
of Heck apply pre-conviction as well as post-conviction,” which means that “a prisoner 
seeking to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure in a § 1983 
claim must show that a decision in his favor would not imply the invalidity of his out-
standing conviction . . . [and] that a decision in his favor would not imply the invalid-
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IV. ANALYZING WALLACE V. KATO 
Wallace marked the Court’s first elucidation of the Heck bar; it 
clarified that Heck was not intended to prevent a § 1983 claim by a 
plaintiff who had not yet been criminally convicted.
36
  At the age of 
fifteen, Andre Wallace was arrested on murder charges in the state of 
Illinois in January 1994.
37
  After a lengthy interrogation, he agreed to 
confess to the murder and thereafter signed an incriminating state-
ment prepared by and at the request of state attorneys.
38
  Before the 
murder trial, Wallace unsuccessfully attempted to suppress his state-
ments, claiming that they were the product of an unlawful arrest.
39
  In 
the ensuing trial, Wallace was convicted of the murder and sentenced 
to twenty-six years in prison.
40
 
Wallace appealed the conviction, again contending that the in-
criminating statements were the fruit of an unlawful arrest.
41
  In De-
cember 1998, the Appellate Court of Illinois found that the officers 
had violated Wallace’s Fourth Amendment rights, holding that they 
had arrested him without probable cause.
42
  The court further found 
that Wallace’s presence at the police station prior to his formal ar-
rest—during which time the interrogation at issue occurred—
amounted to an involuntary, and thus illegal, seizure of his person.
43
  
 
ity of a future conviction.” (emphasis added)); Covington v. City of New York, 171 
F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]f success on [a § 1983] claim would necessarily im-
ply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, such a claim does 
not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution 
continues to exist.” (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d 
Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Beck v. City of Muskogee Police 
Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Heck precludes § 1983 claims relating to 
pending charges when a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply 
the invalidity of any conviction or sentence that might result from prosecution of the 
pending charges.  Such claims arise at the time the charges are dismissed.” (emphasis 
added)); Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1006–07 (11th Cir. 1998); Washington v. 
Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If success on these claims would 
have necessarily implied the invalidity of a potential conviction on the murder 
charge, then Washington’s claims did not accrue until the day on which the murder 
charge was dismissed . . . .”); Smith, 87 F.3d at 113 (“In terms of the conflicts which 
Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference between a conviction which is outstanding 
at the time the civil rights action is instituted and a potential conviction on a pending 
charge that may be entered at some point thereafter.”). 
 36 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). 
 37 Id. at 386. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 People v. Wallace, 701 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 42 Id. at 94. 
 43 Id. 
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This decision came nearly five years after Wallace’s arrest.
44
  Following 
another round of appeals and nearly three more years, the appellate 
court found, in August 2001, that the illegal seizure rendered Wal-
lace’s statements inadmissible in the criminal trial and therefore re-
manded the case for a new trial.
45
  Unwilling to proceed to trial with-
out the incriminating statements as evidence, the prosecutors 
decided to drop the murder charges against Wallace in April 2002.
46
 
Within one year of the prosecution dropping the charges, Wal-
lace instituted a § 1983 action against the City of Chicago and several 
of its officers, seeking damages resulting from his unlawful arrest.
47
  
Wallace brought the action in April 2003, nine years after the occur-
rence of the underlying events—the murder and his subsequent ar-
rest.
48
  Although Wallace filed his § 1983 claim within one year of the 
state criminal proceedings terminating in his favor, the district court 
found that his claim was time-barred because the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations for personal-injury torts had expired.
49
  On ap-
peal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court 
that Wallace’s claim accrued at the time of his arrest, not when his 
conviction was later invalidated.
50
 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, seizing the opportunity 
to clear up the confusion over § 1983 claim accrual that resulted from 
Heck.
51
  The Court noted that the Seventh Circuit’s approach and the 
Heck approach would produce very different results.
52
  On the one 
hand, “if the statute on [Wallace’s] cause of action began to run at 
the time of his unlawful arrest, or even at the time he was ordered 
held by a magistrate, his § 1983 suit was plainly dilatory.”
53
  On the 
 
 44 See id. at 87. 
 45 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.   
 50 Id. 
 51 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387. 
 52 Id. at 387–88. 
 53 Id. at 387.  The statute of limitations was tolled in this case, but only for the 
amount of time that it took for Wallace to reach the age of majority: “two-plus years.”  
Id. at 388.  The Court ultimately concluded that Wallace’s false imprisonment ended 
at the time “when legal process was initiated against him, and the statute would have 
begun to run from that date, but for its tolling by reason of [his] minority.”  Id. at 
390. 
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other hand, if “the commencement date for running of the statute 
[wa]s governed by . . . Heck v. Humphrey, that date may [have been] 
the date on which [Wallace’s] conviction was vacated, in which case 
the § 1983 suit would have been timely filed.”
54
  Recognizing this 
great disparity, the Court sought to elucidate the true meaning of 
Heck and adjudge Wallace’s case in accordance with it. 
The Court opened its opinion by distinguishing between claim 
accrual and the commencement of the running of the statute of limi-
tations.
55
  In holding that a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment ac-
crues at the time of arrest, it reiterated the well-established principle 
that a claim accrues when the litigant has a “complete and present 
cause of action.”
56
  The Court then asserted that Wallace was entitled 
to, and thus could have, filed his § 1983 claim as soon as the wrongful 
arrest occurred.
57
  Accordingly, the Court noted, the statute of limita-
tions would typically begin to run at the time of accrual.
58
  The Court 
acknowledged, however, that impracticalities may prevent a victim 
still imprisoned as a result of the unlawful arrest from bringing suit.
59
  
The commencement of the statute of limitations on a false impris-
onment claim is thus somewhat delayed so as to compensate for this 
impediment until the victim becomes held pursuant to legal pro-
cess—“when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or ar-
raigned on charges.”
60
  The Court, however, made it clear that this 
did not mean that Wallace could not have filed his § 1983 claim im-
mediately upon his arrest, for although the statute of limitations had 
not begun to run at that time, Wallace had still been sufficiently in-
jured by the arrest itself to bring suit.
61
  Ultimately, the Wallace Court 
refused to embrace the argument that the statute of limitations on a 
false arrest claim begins to run only after a possible future conviction 
occurs and is invalidated.
62
  The Court also rejected the notion that 
 
 54 Id. at 388. 
 55 Id. at 388–89. 
 56 Id. at 388 (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. 
Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.  The Court noted that Wallace had been held without 
legal process; the officers did not have a warrant for his arrest, nor did they have 
probable cause to justify his detention.  Id. at 389. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. at 389.   
 61 Id. at 390 n.3. 
 62 Id. at 392. 
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the statute of limitations on the claim should be tolled until this hy-
pothetical future conviction is set aside.
63
 
Recognizing the pervasive misperception among the circuit 
courts regarding § 1983 claim accrual, the Wallace Court noted what 
had especially complicated the issue of accrual in Heck and most like-
ly led to such confusion; the Heck Court had “analogized [Heck’s] 
suit to one for malicious prosecution, an element of which is the fa-
vorable termination of criminal proceedings.”
64
  Although a criminal 
defendant cannot file a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution until the 
underlying criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor, favor-
able termination is not an essential element of all personal-injury 
torts for which § 1983 can be invoked.  After the Court asserted that 
false imprisonment ends once the victim is held pursuant to legal 
process, it sought to elucidate the distinction between malicious 
prosecution and false imprisonment.
65
  The Court noted that once 
the arrestee becomes detained pursuant to legal process, any unlaw-
ful detention thereafter 
forms part of the damages for the entirely distinct tort of mali-
cious prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not 
by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal pro-
cess.  If there is a false arrest claim, damages for that claim cover 
the time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment, 
but not more.  From that point on, any damages recoverable must 
be based on a malicious prosecution claim . . . .
66
 
The Court accordingly rejected Wallace’s argument that his false im-
prisonment did not end until he was released from custody when the 
state dropped the charges against him.
67
  To obtain damages resulting 
from his detention spanning the time of his arraignment through his 
release from custody, Wallace would have had to bring an action for 
malicious prosecution.  As noted earlier, favorable termination is an 
essential element of a malicious prosecution claim;
68
 thus, his claim 
for injuries incurred during that period of detention would not have 
accrued until the state dropped the charges against him.  Theoreti-
 
 63 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 392–93. 
 64 Id. at 392; see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (“[T]he hoary prin-
ciple that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of 
outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily 
require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just 
as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.”). 
 65 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–90. 
 66 Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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cally speaking, if Wallace had brought a § 1983 claim for malicious 
prosecution in addition to his claim for false imprisonment, his claim 
of malicious prosecution, whether meritorious or not, would have 
been timely filed; he instituted his § 1983 action within one year of 
the criminal proceedings terminating in his favor, which occurred 
when the prosecution dropped the charges against him in April 
2002.
69
  Because the governing statute of limitations in this case was 
two years, Wallace would have had until April 2004 to bring such an 
action.
70
 
Prior to the Wallace Court’s clear distinction between these two 
torts, lower courts mistakenly extended the malicious prosecution 
standard to other § 1983 claims—such as false arrest, false imprison-
ment, and selective enforcement—holding favorable termination to 
be a requirement of Heck, and construing Heck as barring a § 1983 
claim, which, if resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, would effectively im-
pugn the validity of an anticipated future conviction.
71
  Notwithstand-
ing this pervasive interpretation of Heck, the Wallace Court quickly 
dismissed its validity and characterized such extensions of Heck as “bi-
zarre:”
72
 
In an action for false arrest it would require the plaintiff . . . to 
speculate about whether a prosecution will be brought, whether it 
will result in conviction, and whether the pending civil action will 
impugn that verdict . . . .  And what if the plaintiff . . . guesses 
wrong, and the anticipated future conviction never occurs, be-
cause of acquittal or dismissal?  Does that event . . . trigger accrual 
of the cause of action?  Or what if prosecution never occurs—
what will the trigger be then?  We are not disposed to embrace 
this bizarre extension of Heck.
73
 
Instead, the Court reinforced that Heck’s rule of deferred accrual ap-
plies only when an outstanding criminal judgment exists at the time 
of filing.
74
  It further noted that, even if Heck were to apply to the date 
on which the statute of limitations began to run rather than to the 
date of accrual, at neither point in time was a criminal conviction in 
existence that Wallace’s § 1983 action could potentially have im-
 
 69 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See cases cited supra note 35; supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
 72 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id.  
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pugned.
75
  Therefore, nothing about Heck should have barred Wal-
lace’s § 1983 suit at that time, or prevented him from filing it. 
Through Wallace, the Court clarified years of misinterpretations 
of its prior decision and affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that 
Wallace’s § 1983 claim was barred by the statute of limitations be-
cause his unlawful-arrest claim accrued at the time that he was arrest-
ed.  Wallace did not need to wait until the state obtained a conviction 
against him—which at the time of his arrest was only a possibility—
and then again until that conviction was later set aside for his claim to 
accrue.
76
 
Although the impracticalities that the majority claimed would 
result from preventing a delayed § 1983 accrual are not without mer-
it,
77
 these concerns do not justify the Court’s refusal to implement 
equitable tolling on a § 1983 claim once a criminal proceeding is in-
stituted against a § 1983 litigant.  The Court did propose one poten-
tial remedy, suggesting that it would be within the district court’s dis-
cretion to stay the § 1983 civil action in such a situation, pending the 
outcome of the state criminal proceedings.
78
  The only situation in 
which Heck would require dismissal of the § 1983 claim would be 
when the plaintiff is convicted and the stayed civil action would ques-
tion the validity of that conviction.
79
  This procedural “safeguard,” 
however, falls short of fully protecting the § 1983 plaintiff from hav-
ing to litigate his civil claim and defend against his criminal charge 
simultaneously, as this power to stay is merely discretionary and may 
not always be effectuated.  As Justice Breyer noted in his dissenting 
opinion, “In the absence of a stay, a litigant . . . would have . . . to di-
vide his attention between criminal and civil cases with attendant risks 
of loss of time and energy as well as of inconsistent findings.”
80
  Hav-
ing to divide his attention between the two cases would also impede 
the litigant’s ability to defend himself in the best possible way in his 
criminal trial, the magnitude of which is exemplified by Wallace itself; 
Wallace was in custody and facing a twenty-six-year prison sentence 
throughout the duration of the state criminal proceedings, but, at the 
 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 390. 
 77 Id. at 393. 
 78 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393–94 (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has 
been convicted . . . it is within the power of the district court . . . to stay the civil ac-
tion until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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same time, the majority expected him to have also been litigating his 
§ 1983 claim.
81
 
B. Justice Breyer’s Dissent and the Court’s Refusal to Adopt Equitable 
Tolling 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer characterized the major-
ity’s rule as one “that would require immediate filing, followed by an 
uncertain system of stays, dismissals, and possible refiling.”
82
  He in-
stead argued that the implementation of equitable tolling in such § 
1983 suits would offer a preferable result.
83
  Courts have applied equi-
table tolling “[w]here a plaintiff because of disability, irremediable 
lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control just 
cannot reasonably be expected to sue in time.”
84
  Justice Breyer thus 
advocated for the statute of limitations on the § 1983 claim to be eq-
uitably tolled for the duration of the criminal trial, and even for the 
time during which the litigant challenges his conviction on appeal.
85
  
The majority, however, was unmoved by the argument and refused to 
adopt a federal tolling rule to that effect.
86
 
Justice Breyer argued that equitable tolling should apply “where 
a § 1983 plaintiff reasonably claims that the unlawful behavior of 
which he complains was, or will be, necessary to a criminal convic-
tion.”
87
  Once that is established, the limitations period could be equi-
tably tolled (1) from the time charges are brought until dismissal, ac-
quittal, or conviction and (2) during the appeals process.88  It is clear 
that Justice Breyer’s proposed tolling rule would ensure a tight nexus 
between the § 1983 claim and the underlying criminal action.  Of 
course, despite this tight nexus, courts will, at times, toll § 1983 claims 
even though the claims would not be barred under Heck.
89
 While this 
approach is over-inclusive, this would be but a negligible conse-
quence of adequately protecting the target class of § 1983 litigants 
whose claims would be barred by Heck.  Further, the cost of over-
inclusiveness is outweighed by the benefit that equitable tolling 
 
 81 Id. at 386 (majority opinion). 
 82 Id. at  400 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Wallace, 549 U.S. at  400 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Runyon, 77 
F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85 Id. at 401. 
 86 Id. at 394 (majority opinion). 
 87 Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
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would prevent the possible § 1983 plaintiff, defendant, and even the 
federal court, from having to “speculate as to whether the claims are 
in any way barred until the state court has had the opportunity to 
consider the claims in the criminal context.”
90
  This would also re-
duce the risk of inconsistent legal determinations.  A state court 
could acquit the defendant, or overturn his conviction on appeal, af-
ter finding a constitutional violation that negates the validity of the 
charge or conviction, while the federal court, trying the § 1983 claim 
simultaneously, could find there to be no constitutional violation—or 
vice versa.
91
 
Breyer further opined that if tolling were employed, plaintiffs 
would very rarely, if ever, choose to file a § 1983 claim while the crim-
inal case is still pending or on-going in order to devote due diligence 
and attention to the criminal trial.
92
  Even if they did choose to file at 
this time, Justice Breyer noted, the district court could, in those rare 
cases, stay the action if it chose or dismiss the claim without prejudice 
without fear that the statute of limitations would run by the conclu-
sion of the criminal proceedings and leave the plaintiff without a 
remedy.
93
  Perhaps the most important rationale behind the employ-
ment of equitable tolling under these circumstances is that it will 
“above all, assure a plaintiff who possesses a meritorious § 1983 claim 
that his pursuit of criminal remedies designed to free him from un-
lawful confinement will not compromise his later ability to obtain civ-
il § 1983 redress as well.”
94
  A harmed individual should not have to 
forgo the opportunity to pursue a claim of damages for a constitu-
tional violation in order to rightfully devote full attention and re-
sources to a criminal action in which he is fighting for freedom.  A 
criminal defendant’s interest in freedom from unlawful confinement 
is necessarily paramount, and the import of this interest should not 
be diminished through the forced juggling of another proceeding.  
Nor should it preclude him from seeking other forms of relief for the 
suffered constitutional violation beyond release from unlawful custo-
dy.  He should have the opportunity to litigate both actions fully and 
completely and should not have to choose one over the other or jug-
gle both proceedings simultaneously, which would necessarily cause 
him to devote less time and attention to each proceeding. 
 
 90 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 403. 
 91 Id. at 403. 
 92 Id. at 404. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 403. 
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The majority did recognize the difficulty a litigant would face in 
having to divide attention between the criminal and civil actions as a 
rationale for the employment of equitable tolling, though it identi-
fied this concern as the “only rationale for such a rule.”
95
  Despite the 
validity of the litigant’s interest in primarily dedicating and focusing 
energy on the criminal proceedings, the Court commented that equi-
table tolling was not an appropriate tool to avoid the possibility of 
concurrent litigation.
96
  It merely retorted, rather insensitively, 
“[W]hen has it been the law that a criminal defendant, or a potential 
criminal defendant, is absolved from all other responsibilities that the 
law would otherwise place upon him?”
97
  Equitable tolling, however, 
would not absolve the defendant of his legal responsibilities; rather, it 
would give a defendant who has a meritorious constitutional claim 
and who does not deserve of a criminal conviction an adequate op-
portunity to vindicate his claim and obtain relief from the injury he 
suffered at the hands of state officials. 
In rejecting Justice Breyer’s argument for equitable tolling, the 
Court relied on the fact that it generally refers to state law for the ap-
plicable tolling rules and thus declined to deviate from the norm and 
develop a federal tolling rule.
98
  The disparity among the states’ toll-
ing laws, however, warrants the implementation of a federal tolling 
statute because it is impractical to force a (potential) criminal de-
fendant to file his civil § 1983 claim immediately and then manage 
both proceedings simultaneously.
99
 
As discussed below, an additional reason for the majority’s rejec-
tion of Justice Breyer’s equitable tolling argument was the concern 
that equitable tolling would encourage the filing of meritless § 1983 
claims by manipulative crafters of “conviction-impugning cause[s] of 
action.”
100
  In reality, however, the majority’s refusal to adopt equita-
ble tolling “means that large numbers of defendants will be sued im-
 
 95 Id. at 396 (majority opinion). 
 96 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 396. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 394 (explaining that no Illinois cases had “provid[ed] tolling in even re-
motely comparable circumstances”).  
 99 Although Justice Breyer recognized that “§ 1983 ordinarily borrows its limita-
tions principles from state law,” he argued that “[i]f a given state court lacks the nec-
essary tolling provision, . . . § 1983 . . . [should] permit[] the federal courts to devise 
and impose such principles.”  Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Indeed, “[g]aps in 
federal civil rights acts should be filled by state law, as long as that law is not incon-
sistent with the federal law” and its “goals of uniformity and federalism.”  Id. (citing 
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538–40 (1989)). 
 100 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395 (majority opinion).  
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mediately by all potential § 1983 plaintiffs with arguable Heck issues, 
no matter how meritless the claims.” 
101
  These plaintiffs’ sole motiva-
tion is the desire to preserve a potential § 1983 claim in case it be-
comes apparent during the state criminal proceedings that they were 
victims of a constitutional violation, rather than a sincere belief that 
they have suffered such a violation.  Equitable tolling, however, would 
prevent the courts from being bombarded by these potentially un-
necessary “protective filings,” as these criminal defendants—and po-
tential § 1983 litigants—could rest assured, “secure in the knowledge 
that the suit,” if eventually worth pursuing, “could be timely filed at a 
later date.”
102
 
Admittedly, a federal equitable tolling rule in this context would 
be most effective and practical if it were applied retrospectively.  Oth-
erwise, “it would not be known whether tolling is appropriate by rea-
son of the Heck bar until it is established that the newly entered con-
viction would be impugned by the not-yet-filed, and thus utterly 
indeterminate, § 1983 claim.”
103
  The majority, however, rejected the 
possibility of determining whether to employ tolling retrospectively, 
offering only the argument that defendants must be alerted in ad-
vance of the need to preserve evidence and other relevant materials 
beyond the normal limitations period in the event that tolling were to 
prolong the viability of the claim.
104
  The Court observed that the ret-
rospective extension of the limitations period by a plaintiff who has 
“craft[ed] a conviction-impugning cause of action” would frustrate 
this need.
105
  Unfortunately, the majority took into consideration only 
the plaintiff who has designed or “crafted” a case to trigger the Heck 
bar and thus trigger this hypothetical federal tolling rule.  What the 
Court seemingly failed to consider is the plaintiff with a potentially 
meritorious § 1983 claim who did not need to “craft[] a conviction-
impugning cause of action” but instead had one due to the officers 
who violated his constitutional rights.  The Court failed to consider 
the plaintiff who had received a favorable disposition in his criminal 
trial or won the appeal from his conviction because the state deter-
mined that he was the victim of a constitutional violation.  The Court 
failed to consider the plaintiff who did not file his civil claim within 
the limitations period because he was acting in reliance on prior in-
terpretations of Heck and was thus under the common misconception 
 
 101 Id. at 404 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 102 Id. at 403, 404 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 103 Id. at 394–95 (majority opinion). 
 104 Id. at 395. 
 105 Id. 
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that his claim would not accrue until the criminal proceedings had 
terminated in his favor.  The Court failed to consider the plaintiff 
who did not timely file his civil claim because he was understandably 
and rightfully consumed with defending himself throughout the du-
ration of the underlying criminal action. 
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE WALLACE DECISION 
The Wallace decision has placed criminal defendants who have 
potentially meritorious § 1983 claims at a disadvantage.  Wallace’s re-
quirement that criminal defendants file their § 1983 claims within a 
very short limitations period makes it difficult for such litigants to 
vindicate their rights. The applicable limitations period is likely to be 
much shorter than the amount of time it typically takes to fully liti-
gate criminal charges in state court and thereafter seek post-
conviction relief from the state if necessary.  The terrible conse-
quences of the Wallace decision would have been eliminated had the 
Court accepted Justice Breyer’s proposal of a federal rule of equitable 
tolling.  Should a criminal defense attorney now be obligated to in-
form his clients that they might have civil claims that they need to file 
right away? 
Further, the limitations period should certainly be tolled for the 
time when the Heck bar is triggered to the time when the criminal de-
fendant subsequently finds success on appeal from his conviction or 
through post-conviction relief.  Such tolling is especially necessary in 
light of the inequities that would result from the type of situations 
contemplated in the fourth footnote of the majority opinion.
106
  Fail-
ure to toll contravenes the intent behind the Heck decision, and even 
the intent of the Wallace majority. 
A. Wallace’s Effect—Forcing Immediate Filing of § 1983 Claims 
Wallace essentially requires a § 1983 litigant to file his civil claim 
immediately and perhaps even before institution of the criminal prose-
cution against him.  To use the language of Wallace, there are “bi-
zarre” results from forcing a person who might be prosecuted to initi-
ate litigation within the two-year period of limitations.
107
  Specifically, 
this process effectively binds prosecutors’ hands to proceed with the 
criminal charge in an effort to protect the police officers who have 
potentially violated the litigant’s constitutional rights.  Another possi-
 
 106 For a discussion of the circumstances contemplated in footnote four of the 
Wallace majority opinion, see infra Part V.B. 
 107 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393. 
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bility is that it may even encourage prosecutors to punish the litigant 
for his audacity, as one of the dangers of forcing the litigant to file his 
§ 1983 claim immediately is that “[p]rosecutors and police could 
press for more severe sentences for those who dare to sue the po-
lice.”
108
  This, too, would be a “result surely not intended”
 109
 by the 
Wallace Court.  
Further, even if the § 1983 litigant does not file his civil claim be-
fore institution of the underlying criminal proceedings, the short 
statute of limitations period, coupled with the reality that criminal ac-
tions consume a significant amount of time110 necessarily means that, 
under Wallace, “[c]lients with pending criminal charges [will] be 
forced to pursue civil actions at the same time [that] their criminal 
charges are pending.”
111
  Some dangers likely to result from such a 
system include plea bargains contingent on the defendant surrender-
ing his civil claim, as well as forced waiver of the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
112
  An individual who 
has suffered a constitutional violation should not have to choose be-
tween available remedies when he is entitled to both.  Nor should he 
have to divide attention and resources between two proceedings, es-
pecially where his freedom is at stake in one of those proceedings. 
As mentioned, the Wallace Court suggested a possible remedy to 
this problem, stating that when the plaintiff timely files his § 1983 
claim, it would be within the district court’s discretion to stay the ac-
tion pending the outcome of the underlying criminal proceeding.
113
  
The Court, however, did not mandate that district courts stay the ac-
tion in such circumstances and did not suggest that the power to stay 
the action is anything more than discretionary.
114
  In fact, lower courts 
have relied on this language in denying motions to stay a § 1983 
claim pending the outcome of a criminal action.
115
 
Although some courts have relied on this language from the 
Wallace opinion to grant motions to stay a civil action,
116
 it remains 
 
 108 Chanin, supra note 33, at 2. 
 109 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395 n.4.  
 110 In Wallace, the state criminal proceedings spanned more than eight years. 
 111 Chanin, supra note 33, at 2. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394–95.  
 114 Id. 
 115 See, e.g., Cress v. City of Ventnor, No. 08-1873, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22172, at 
*12–13 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009) (rejecting the argument that Wallace requires courts to 
enter a stay and holding that this decision is within the courts’ discretion). 
 116 See, e.g., Telfair v. Tandy, No. 08-731, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83462, at *18 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2008) (granting a motion to stay the § 1983 action alleging false ar-
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problematic that the decision to stay is discretionary rather than 
mandatory.  If the district courts decide not to exercise their power of 
abstention and stay the civil action pending resolution of the underly-
ing criminal proceeding, a possibility of inconsistent judgments from 
the state and federal courts arises.
117
  It is very likely that a defendant 
could be convicted in the underlying state criminal trial and yet be 
successful in federal court on his § 1983 claim upon a finding of a 
constitutional violation that, if found by the state court, would have 
prevented conviction.  Such a result is nonsensical.  It is better to al-
low the state courts to first deal with and dispose of the criminal ac-
tion before the federal court entertains the § 1983 claim.  As Justice 
Breyer pointed out in his dissent in Wallace, if the district court refus-
es to stay the §1983 action, the litigant will be forced to divide his at-
tention between the two cases, compromising his efficacy and chanc-
es of success in both actions, and risking inconsistent findings.
118
  It is 
further problematic that even when courts do opt to stay the civil ac-
tion, “the stay may extend for years while post-conviction relief is 
sought” if the litigant is convicted on the underlying charges, which 
presents a less than ideal situation considering “the potential to clog 
the court[s’] docket[s] with unresolvable cases.”
119
  The more effi-
cient approach is to mandate equitable tolling of a litigant’s § 1983 
claim from the time when criminal charges are filed through acquit-
tal or reversal of the conviction on appeal. 
B. Wallace’s Footnote Four and the “Result Surely Not Intended” 
In Wallace, the Court acknowledged that § 1983 actions some-
times accrue before the related criminal conviction—that is, before 
the Heck bar is triggered.
120
  This, the Court noted, “raises the ques-
tion whether, assuming that the Heck bar takes effect when the later 
conviction is obtained, the statute of limitations on the once valid 
cause of action is tolled as long as the Heck bar subsists.”
121
  Using the 
case before it as an example, the Court noted that if Wallace’s convic-
tion had “caused the statute of limitations on his (possibly) impugn-
ing but yet-to-be-filed cause of action to be tolled until the conviction 
 
rest in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the criminal proceedings were 
ongoing). 
 117 See Whitley v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 07-403, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21262, at *75 
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (citing DiNicola v. DiPaolo, 945 F. Supp. 848, 860–61 (W.D. 
Pa. 1996)). 
 118 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 119 Telfair, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83462, at *22, *23. 
 120 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394. 
 121 Id. 
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was set aside, his filing . . . would have been timely.”
122
  Recognizing 
that state law provides the tolling rules, the Court first looked to see if 
Illinois had provided tolling in comparable circumstances.
123
  The 
search, however, proved unfruitful.
124
  The Court then rejected the 
adoption of a federal tolling rule.
125
 
In footnote four of the decision, the Court commented that if a 
§ 1983 plaintiff were to file suit upon his arrest and his suit were sub-
sequently dismissed under Heck upon his conviction in the underlying 
criminal action, “the statute of limitations, absent tolling, would have 
run by the time he obtain[s] reversal of his conviction.  If under 
those circumstances he were not allowed to refile his suit, Heck would 
produce immunity from § 1983 liability, a result surely not intended.”
126
  
Although the Court acknowledged that the statute of limitations 
should not run during this time period, it declined to address how 
such a situation should be handled.  The Court was able to avoid this 
result since Wallace, the petitioner before the Court, had not timely 
filed his § 1983 claim.  It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to 
decide the amount of time Wallace would have had to refile his § 
1983 suit once the Heck bar was removed when his conviction was re-
versed.
127
 
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to develop a federal tolling 
rule to take effect when there are criminal and civil proceedings tak-
ing place simultaneously that arise out of the same incident and in-
volve the same parties, the statute of limitations should definitely be 
tolled for the time in which the Heck bar would take effect, regardless 
of whether the criminal defendant has yet filed his § 1983 claim.  This 
means that the statute of limitations should be tolled in circumstanc-
es like those contemplated in footnote four—from the time that a § 
1983 litigant who filed his claim upon arrest is convicted in his under-
lying criminal trial through the time during which the litigant appeals 
his conviction.  The statute of limitations should also be tolled in a 
case like Wallace in which the criminal defendant has not yet filed his 
§ 1983 claim, but tolling from the time of conviction through appeal 
would prevent the statute of limitations from expiring.  In either sce-
nario, equitable tolling for the duration of this time period would 
protect those with potentially meritorious § 1983 claims who found 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 127 Id. 
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success on appeal from their convictions from being barred by the 
statute of limitations.
128
 
VI. ARGUING FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING DUE TO RELIANCE ON PRE-
EXISTING PRECEDENT 
Although the method for dealing with § 1983 claim accrual as 
announced by the Wallace Court was inconsistent with the then-
predominately accepted practice of the circuit courts, the majority re-
fused to adopt a federal rule of equitable tolling to alleviate the tran-
sition.
129
  Perhaps most problematic about the Wallace decision is its 
retroactive application—that is, its application to § 1983 claims aris-
ing out of events that occurred before the Court decided the inter-
vening Wallace decision.
130
  Inequities result when a new legal rule is 
strictly applied against a plaintiff who understandably relied on prior 
interpretations of the law and acted in accordance with it.  Courts 
should employ equitable tolling in its own right on the grounds that a 
litigant’s reliance on pre-existing precedent, or misinterpretation of 
the law created by courts’ confusion, should not prejudice a litigant 
with a potentially meritorious claim whose failure to comply with the 
law and file within the statute of limitations is not due to a lack of dil-
igence on his part. 
Recently, in Dique v. New Jersey State Police, the Third Circuit re-
lied on Wallace in overruling its previous incorrect interpretations of 
Heck.131  In that case, Dique had been arrested for possession of drugs 
in January 1990 and was ultimately convicted on such drug-related 
 
 128 For an example of how a lower court has dealt with Wallace’s footnote four, see 
Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007).  The court relied on 
the footnote’s language in applying equitable tolling due to the plaintiff’s reasonable 
reliance on the circuit’s precedential interpretations of Heck that were ultimately 
overruled by Wallace.  Id. at 775.  The court found that the plaintiff reasonably be-
lieved that his § 1983 cause of action for illegal seizure did not accrue until his con-
viction was overturned because of preexisting precedent in the circuit.  Id.  The court 
thus held that equitable tolling should be applied to avoid a virtual § 1983 immuni-
ty—a “result surely not intended” by Wallace.  Id. (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395 
n.4). 
 129 Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d  at 770. 
 130 See Hargroves v. City of New York, 694 F. Supp. 2d 198, 211 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010) (noting that Wallace applies retroactively); Mallard v. Potenza, No. 94-CV-223, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86336, at *10–11 (E.D.N.Y.  Nov. 21, 2007) (holding that Wal-
lace should be applied retroactively); cf. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 
749, 752 (1995) (holding that when the Court applies a new legal rule to the parties 
before it, other courts must apply the rule retroactively).  
 131 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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charges in June 1999.
132
  In April of 2002, twelve years after his arrest 
and three years after his conviction, the court vacated Dique’s convic-
tion because “colorable issues of racial profiling existed at the time of 
the arrest,” and he was released from prison.
133
  Thereafter, Dique 
filed § 1983 claims for false arrest and selective-enforcement.
134
  Ini-
tially, the district court dismissed Dique’s claim, finding it to be time-
barred.
135
  Dique successfully appealed, however, in light of the Third 
Circuit’s 2005 decision of Gibson v. Superintendent of New Jersey Depart-
ment of Law & Public Safety, which had interpreted Heck to mean that a 
§ 1983 claim does not accrue until a potential future conviction is re-
versed, expunged, or invalidated.
136
  The Third Circuit therefore re-
manded the case and the district court ruled that Dique’s claims sur-
vived.
137
  During discovery on remand, the Supreme Court decided 
Wallace and the district court granted the officers’ motions for sum-
mary judgment, ruling that Dique’s claims were time-barred under 
Wallace.
138
  The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Supreme 
Court’s intervening decision required overruling of the court’s previ-
ous opinion.
139
 
Dique illuminates the inequities that result when Wallace is ap-
plied against a litigant who relied upon prior interpretations of Heck 
in refraining from filing his § 1983 claim until the criminal action 
terminated in his favor.  The Third Circuit did not employ equitable 
tolling to preserve Dique’s claim even though he relied on Gibson and 
other pre-Wallace interpretations of Heck.
140
  Accordingly, Dique, 
whose convictions had already been overturned at the state-level due 
to the finding of a constitutional violation, was left without a remedy 
for such intrusion upon his rights.
141
 
 
 132 Id. at 183.  The nine-year gap occurred because he became a fugitive.  Id. at 
183 n.3. 
 133 Id. at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id.  
 136 Id. (citing Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 411 
F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 137 Dique, 603 F.3d at 184. 
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. at 188.  “[A]n intervening Supreme Court decision is a sufficient basis for  
. . . overrul[ing] a prior panel’s opinion.”  Id. at 187. 
 140 Id. 
 141 The statute of limitations was equitably tolled for some time in this case, 
though it was not due to the defendant’s reliance on pre-existing precedent.  In-
stead, the statute was tolled under the discovery rule, under which “the accrual of the 
claim [is] postponed until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable 
diligence and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an 
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Kucharski v. Leveille presents another example of a criminal case 
that was ongoing at the time of the Wallace decision.
142
  In March of 
2001, William Kucharski, Sr. and William Kucharski, Jr. were both ar-
rested in connection with a motor vehicle accident.
143
  Both were con-
victed in state-court proceedings, but the appellate court ultimately 
reversed some of these convictions in 2004 after finding Fourth 
Amendment violations.
144
  The convictions were reversed in Septem-
ber of 2004.
145
  Within a year, Kucharski Sr. and Kucharski Jr. filed a § 
1983 claim for the illegal seizure.
146
  Initially, the district court reject-
ed the officers’ argument that the § 1983 claim, which was filed more 
than four years after the seizure in question, was barred by the statute 
of limitations.
147
 
Shortly after this ruling, the court instructed both parties to file 
briefs commenting on Wallace’s effect on the statute of limitations is-
sues in the case at hand.
148
  After reviewing the briefs, the court 
granted summary judgment in the officers’ favor, finding that under 
Wallace the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limita-
tions.
149
  Looking to the Supreme Court for guidance, the district 
court noted that “although the practice announced by the Supreme 
Court was somewhat at odds with the general understanding of Heck, 
the Court did not allow equitable tolling”; therefore the district court 
declined to apply the doctrine as well.
150
 
In a motion for reconsideration, the Kucharskis argued for the 
employment of equitable tolling due to reliance on pre-Wallace prec-
edent.
151
  They waited to file the § 1983 claim until the state court 
convictions were overturned, believing that their § 1983 claim did not 
 
actionable claim.”  Id. at 185.  This was applied to Dique’s selective enforcement 
claim because it was not until 2001 that defense counsel became aware of 90,000 
pages of documents that revealed a state-wide practice of selective enforcement 
based on race.  Id. at 184.  Despite this tolling, however, Dique still filed his § 1983 
claim more than two years after this discovery.  Id.  
 142 526 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 143 Id. at 769.  Kucharski, Jr. was arrested and taken to have his blood tested for 
alcohol; Kucharski Sr. was arrested for attempting to interfere with the arrest of his 
son.  Id. 
 144 Id.  
 145 Id. 
 146 Plaintiffs filed suit on September 26, 2005.  Id.   
 147 Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 769. 
 148 Id. at 770. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Kucharski v. Leveille, 478 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 151 Id. 
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accrue until then.
152
  The presiding court noted that this belief was 
strongly supported by a long line of Sixth Circuit precedent, but that 
since “the Wallace Court did not allow equitable tolling to save the 
plaintiff’s claim in that case, [it] did not consider the possibility in 
the present matter.”
153
  This is the exact danger that Wallace’s failure 
to mandate equitable tolling presents.  Although state law may pro-
vide the remedy of equitable tolling to the plaintiff—as Michigan law 
ultimately did in Kucharski—the presiding court may fail to consider 
the remedy of equitable tolling since the Supreme Court did not 
mandate that such relief be granted. 
Despite the Kucharski court’s initial failure to entertain then no-
tion of equitable tolling, it conducted an extensive tolling analysis in 
deciding the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.
154
  As limitations 
periods and tolling rules are to be determined by the governing 
state’s law, the court referred to Michigan law and found that the 
state’s Supreme Court allowed tolling “when the plaintiff’s failure to 
comply with the statute [of limitations] is a result of the confusing 
state of the law.”
155
  Thus, where the “[p]laintiff’s failure to comply 
with the applicable statute of limitations is the product of an under-
standable confusion about the legal nature of her claim, rather than 
a negligent failure to preserve her rights,” the doctrine of equitable 
tolling applies.
156
  The Michigan Supreme Court was clear, however, 
that the use of such an equitable doctrine was limited to cases in 
which the courts themselves were responsible for the confusion.
157
 
The Kucharski court recognized that a great inequity would result 
if it were to strictly apply Wallace to the case before it: 
If the plaintiffs had filed their case immediately after the search 
on May 4, 2001, Sixth Circuit precedent would have required 
dismissal of the case as barred by Heck.  Once the law changed, 
the plaintiffs’ convictions having been reversed on September 30, 
2004, the plaintiffs would be barred by the statute of limitations 
under Wallace.  This is “a result surely not intended.”
158
 
The court was convinced that the plaintiffs had relied on Sixth Cir-
cuit precedent to their detriment and attributed the untimeliness of 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 771. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 772 (citing Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., 684 N.W.2d 864, 876 
(Mich. 2004); Ward v. Siano, 730 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 775 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 395 n.4 (2007)). 
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the plaintiffs’ complaint to “an understandable confusion about the 
state of the law as to when their claim accrued,” not to any failure on 
their part to diligently pursue their claims.
159
  Their diligence was evi-
denced by the fact that the plaintiffs filed their § 1983 claims within 
one year of reversal of their convictions, which marked the time at 
which they had reasonably believed that the claims had accrued.
160
  
Accordingly, the court found that “this [was] the unusual case that 
fit[] neatly within the doctrine of equitable tolling.”
161
  The court also 
concluded that “Michigan law tolled the three-year statute of limita-
tions while the plaintiffs’ convictions were still viable, and filing this 
case within three years of the reversal of those convictions d[id] not 
result in a statute of limitations bar.”
162
  Thus, the plaintiffs were not 
denied the right to pursue a remedy for the Fourth Amendment vio-
lations that they had suffered—violations that the state appellate 
court already found.
163
 
Offering equitable tolling in this context is crucial to the protec-
tion of those § 1983 plaintiffs whose claims are likely meritorious, 
considering that these are the plaintiffs who have received favorable 
outcomes in their criminal trials or on appeal from their convictions.  
Reliance on prior interpretations of Heck—especially when preceden-
tial in the governing circuit—does not justify stripping a litigant of his 
ability to receive a remedy for a constitutional violation, for which he 
has already suffered extensively while enduring lengthy and arduous 
state-court criminal proceedings.  There should be an exception to 
barring a potentially meritorious claim where a litigant has been vic-
timized by a change in, or new interpretation of, the governing law, 
especially where that litigant, while imprisoned, had little access to 
such information. 
VII.      CONCLUSION 
Equitable tolling, for which Justice Breyer advocated in his Wal-
lace dissent, is the proper procedural safeguard to remedy the inequi-
ties that have resulted from the Wallace decision.  Wallace poses seri-
ous practical problems because it introduces § 1983 litigants to the 
strong possibility that they will have to juggle their civil case alongside 
the criminal case against them in order to prevent the statute of limi-
 
 159 Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 775.  
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 769. 
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tations from running out and leaving them without recourse.  Such 
potential § 1983 litigants should be afforded the opportunity to com-
pletely immerse themselves in the underlying criminal proceedings, 
where their freedom is at stake, without being compelled to present 
an effective civil case at the same time and without fear that the stat-
ute of limitations will run out if they do not do so immediately.  Toll-
ing of the limitations period from the time that criminal proceedings 
are initiated against the plaintiff through acquittal, or in case of a 
conviction through the time appeal is pending, would most effectively 
protect the meritorious claims of potential § 1983 litigants.  Although 
some states have rules that would allow for such tolling, the disparity 
among the states’ tolling laws warrants the Supreme Court’s interven-
tion and implementation of a federal tolling statute to address this 
issue adequately. 
Further, notwithstanding the argument that the limitations peri-
od should be tolled for the duration of the criminal proceeding and 
any subsequent appeal, courts should offer equitable tolling to § 1983 
litigants who have reasonably relied to their detriment on prior in-
terpretations of Heck and have untimely filed their civil claims solely 
because of this confusion.  A criminal defendant should not lose the 
opportunity to seek relief for a constitutional violation where his  
failure to file within the applicable limitations period was due to no 
fault of his own but was instead the product of confusion caused by 
the courts. 
 
